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*(if applicable)*

MEMORANDUM AND POINTS OF AUTHORITY IN  
SUPPORT OF GROUNDS 3.

### VIOLATION OF 5TH & 14TH AMENDMENTS DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES

FOR PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO DEFENSE, PURSUANT TO U.S. V. AGURS (1976)

427 U.S. 974 96 L.Ed.2d 342 96 S.Ct. 2392 THE FURTHER CONTENTIONS OF LOSS AND DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO TROM BETTA YOUNG BLOOD SAMPLE  
Supporting facts:

SEE ATTACHMENT FOR GROUNDS B.

DEPORTATION OF TRIAL JUDGE, TRIER OF FACT, HON. JUDGE HALGREN  
PETITIONER WAS PREVENTED BY TRIAL JUDGE  
FROM MAKING ANY OBJECTIONS. COUNSEL FAILED  
AT SENTENCING, TO EVULMATIVE SENTENCE AND  
PENALTY WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY PRIOR  
FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AN ALLEGED  
VICTIM KIAH MINCEY IN VIOLATION OF 14TH AMEND  
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES  
PROSECUTION FAILED TO DISCLOSE THIS  
ALLEGED VICTIM/WITNESS AFTER A DEFENSE  
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY HAD BEEN FILED, SERVED,  
AND UN RESPONDED TO KIAH MINCEY RESIDENT OF  
THE ALLEGED CRIME SCENE IS A CONVICTED  
FELON, THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO DISCLOSE, WHICH  
QUESTIONS THE ENTIRE CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTIONS  
CASE AS FALSE EVIDENCE, A BLACK PHONE WAS FOUND  
INSIDE HIS HOME, AS HE HAD A CRIMINAL MOTIVE TO DESTROY EVIDENCE,

b. Supporting cases, rules, or other authority: SEE APPENDI V. NEW JERSEY 530 U.S. 466 (2000); SEE KILBOURN V. STATE OF CONN. 560 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 2018) (18-33). SEE CALIFORNIA V. TROMBETTA

467 U.S. 479, 488-489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); U.S. v. VALENZUELA-

BERNAL, 458, U.S. 858, 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed 1193 (1982); SEE ROVIANO

N. U.S. 353, U.S. 53, 61, 77 S. CT. 623 1 L. Ed 2d. 639 (1957); SEE WILLIAMS V

WOOD FORD 306 F.3d 665 (9TH CIR 2002); SEE U.S. v. ADAMSON 291 F.2d 604 (9TH CIR 2002)

SEE CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON, (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 136 S.Ct. 158 LEd. 2d 177, 184 3 EVIDENCE 4TH

王

909 F. Supp. 525

U.S. District Court

S.D. OHIO

Western Ave

Proctor & Hawk Plastics

vs  
Bankers Trust

NO 94-735

DEC. 20, 1995

4th A

VIOLATION OF 5TH.

"right of the people to be secure in  
their persons, houses, papers, and  
effects against unreasonable

searches, AND SEIZURE. PROSECUTIONS USE OF PETITIONERS

(ALLEGED) PHOTO WORK ID'S AND CASINO CARD WERE PREJUDICIAL AND EQUIVALENT TO MAKING  
Negligent record keeping DEFENDANT A WITNESS  
AGAINST HIMSELF

United States Supreme Court Decision  
of Leon in support of its conclusion  
that it is "useful and proper" to  
invoke the exclusionary rule where  
negligent record keeping results in  
unlawful arrest U.S. Const.

514 U.S. 1, 131 L.Ed.2d 31, 63 USLW 4179

Supreme Court of The United States

ARIZONA, Petitioners v. Isaac Evans

NO. 93-1660. Argued Dec. 7, 1994

Decided March 1, 1995

Court of Appeals

172 ARIZ. 314, 836 P.2d 1024

CAL CRIM PR, MO, JI, SENT

## V. OUTRAGEOUS POLICE CONDUCT

- § 29:28 Outrageous police conduct
- § 29:29 —Declaration
- § 29:30 —Points and authorities

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## I. FAILURE TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE

### § 29:1 Loss of Material Witness

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF S.D.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE  
OF CALIFORNIA, }  
BURTON, E.W. #F02720 Plaintiff,  
v. PETITIONER

DIRECTOR OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF  
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION Defendant.

Case No.: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTICE OF MOTION TO  
DISMISS FOR FAILURE OF PROSECUTION  
TO PRESERVE  
MATERIAL WITNESS - NOW JUDGE HALGREN

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time: \_\_\_\_\_

Place: \_\_\_\_\_

TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF S.D. COUNTY  
AND/OR \_\_\_\_\_ [HIS OR HER] REPRESENTATIVE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on \_\_\_\_\_ [date], at \_\_\_\_\_  
[time], or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the  
courtroom of Department \_\_\_\_\_ of the above-entitled court,  
the defendant will move for an order dismissing all charges in  
this action.

This motion will be made on the ground that the actions of  
members of the EC Police Department have prevented the  
defendant from preparing and presenting a meaningful defense  
by failing to preserve a material witness in violation of the Sixth  
Amendment right to compulsory process of witnesses and the  
Fifth Amendment due process clause. -WITNESS - KATH MANCEY

The motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the at-  
tached declaration and memorandum of points and authorities  
served and filed herewith, on such supplemental declarations and  
memoranda of points and authorities as may hereafter be filed  
with the court, ~~on all the papers and records on file in this action,~~ Court Case 2  
and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented  
at the hearing of the motion.

(3)



§ 29:1

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tion of either the defendant or his attorney." (U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982))

**Sanctions:** If the government has deprived the defendant of a material witness, the court may dismiss those counts to which the absent witness would have offered evidence or due process may demand the dismissal of all the charges. (Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 61, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957))

**Informant witness:** If the prosecution revealed the identity of a material witness informant, but does not have a present location for the informant, or if the defense cannot locate the informant after being given an address by the prosecution, the court should conduct a hearing on the reasonableness of the prosecution's good faith efforts to maintain contact with the informant. (Twigg v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 360, 365, 194 Cal. Rptr. 152, 667 P.2d 1165 (1983))

**Deported witness:** If "state action has made a material witness unavailable (by deportation), dismissal is mandated. (People v. Mejia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 574, 579, 129 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1976)) A person arrested along with an undocumented person may be given a form advising them of the right to have the noncitizen witness detained. (See U.S. v. Lujan-Castro, 602 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979))

#### Research References

##### Text References

C.J.S., Criminal Law §§ 476, 486, 510, 1233, 1236, 1246

##### West's Digest References

Criminal Law §700(10)

#### § 29:2 — Declaration

#### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF \_\_\_\_\_

PEOPLE OF THE STATE  
OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

v

Defendant.

Case No.: \_\_\_\_\_

POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT  
OF MOTION TO DISMISS  
FOR FAILURE TO  
PRESERVE  
MATERIAL WITNESS

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Time: \_\_\_\_\_

Place: \_\_\_\_\_

TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF \_\_\_\_\_ COUNTY  
AND/OR \_\_\_\_\_ [HIS OR HER] REPRESENTATIVE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on \_\_\_\_\_ [date], at \_\_\_\_\_ [time], or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the courtroom of Department \_\_\_\_\_ of the above-entitled court, the defendant will move for an order dismissing all charges in this action.

This motion will be made on the ground that the actions of members of the EC Police Department have prevented the  
DEFENDANT HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS  
468 AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT

DEPRIVING DEFENDANT OF MATERIAL WITNESS BY HOLDING IN HIS POSSESSION PAIR COPIES OF RESTRAINING ORDER FROM AN ALLEGED KHAMINEY 4

**ARGUMENT**

UNITED

States Supreme Court recognized that in order to make a showing of materiality "the defendant cannot be expected to render a detailed description of their lost testimony" (U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982)). To make a showing, counsel may rely on statements by the lost witness to third parties, including those contained in police reports, as well as "the defendant's explanation under oath of such evidence would be an acceptable method of establishing the materiality of the missing witness." (People v. Valencia, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 824, 819, 267 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1990))

The Supreme Court recognized that "while a defendant who has not had an opportunity to interview a witness may face a difficult task in making a showing of materiality, the task is not an impossible one. In such circumstances it is of course not possible to make any avowal of *how* a witness may testify. But the events to which a witness might testify, and the relevance of those events to the crime charged, may well demonstrate either the presence or absence of the required materiality." (U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 871, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982))

The High Court cautioned that deference should be paid to the difficulty facing the defense in making a showing of materiality. "As in other cases concerning the loss of material evidence, sanctions will be warranted for deportation of alien witnesses only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact. (Citation) In making such a determination, courts should afford some leeway for the fact that the defendant necessarily proffers a description of the material evidence rather than the evidence itself." (U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873-874, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982))

IV

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IMPOSES A DUTY ON THE POLICE TO MAKE AVAILABLE AN INFORMER MATERIAL WITNESS

When an informer is a material witness on the issue of guilt or innocence, the People must disclose his identity or incur a dismissal. (Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957); Ev C § 1042) The state does not fulfill its obligation of disclosure when it reveals all that it knows, despite the inadequacy of such data to locate the informer. As the court stated in Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 852-853, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586, 464 P.2d 42 (1970):

*AN ALLEGED UNDISCLOSED KIAN MINCEY,*  
472 **A CONVICTED FELONY RESIDENT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME SCENE**

*Encl Encl*

(5)

GOVERNMENTAL MISCONDUCT

PREVENTED

defendant from preparing and presenting a meaningful defense by failing to preserve a material witness in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process of witnesses and the Fifth Amendment due process clause.

The motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the attached declaration and memorandum of points and authorities served and filed herewith, on such supplemental declarations and memoranda of points and authorities as may hereafter be filed with the court, on all the papers and records on file in this action, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing of the motion.

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Attorney for Defendant

NOTES TO FORM

Research References

Text References

C.J.S., Criminal Law §§ 476, 486, 510, 1233, 1236, 1246

West's Digest References

Criminal Law §700(10)

§ 29:3 — Points and authorities

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF \_\_\_\_\_

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF  
CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Defendant.

Case No.: \_\_\_\_\_  
POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES  
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION  
TO DISMISS  
FOR FAILURE TO  
PRESERVE MATERIAL  
WITNESS

Defendant submits the following points and authorities in support of the motion to dismiss for failure to preserve a material witness:

I

GOVERNMENT ACTION WHICH DEPRIVES THE  
DEFENDANT OF A MATERIAL WITNESS IS A VIOLATION  
OF DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY  
PROCESS OF WITNESSES

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."

(6)

ARGUMENT

- 1 UNLAWFULLY INCARCERATED MOVES THIS COURT TO GRANT THIS MOTION
- 2 FOR A NEW TRIAL, AS HIS FEDERALLY GUARANTEED U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL
- 3 RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL HAS BEEN BLATANTLY VIOLATED BY THE
- 4 FAILURE OF PROSECUTION TO TIMELY RESPOND TO DEFENSE
- 5 PRE TRIAL MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY UNDER BRADY AND DUE
- 6 PROCESS VIOLATIONS BY THE FAILURE OF PROSECUTION TO
- 7 DISCLOSE DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO UNITED STATES V. AGURS
- 8 (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 49 LEd 2d 342, 96 S.Ct 2392. 5TH + 14TH U.S. CONST. AMENDMENTS
- 9 STATEMENT OF FACTS AS PROSECUTION FAILED TO TIMELY RESPOND
- 10 TO DEFENSE MOTIONS OF DISCOVERY, DENIED DEFENDANT OF HIS FEDERALLY
- 11 GUARANTEED RIGHT TO A FAIR AND SPEEDY TRIAL. SEE PEOPLE V. ANDERSON
- 12 (2001) 25 C. 4TH 543, 603, 604, 106 C.R. 2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 [DEFENDANT'S
- 13 ASSERTION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT (THIRD BARKER FACTOR) IS "ENTITLED TO STRONG
- 14 EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT" ON ISSUE WHETHER DEFENDANT IS BEING DEPRIVED
- 15 OF THAT RIGHT BECAUSE "[T]HE MORE SERIOUS THE DEPRIVATION, THE MORE
- 16 LIKELY A DEFENDANT IS TO COMPLAIN". PROSECUTION REARRANGED
- 17 DEFENDANT ON THE DAY OF TRIAL TO GAIN A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER
- 18 DEFENDANT AND VIOLATED P.C. § 1009 WHICH STATES; CERTAIN
- 19 AMENDMENTS ARE PROHIBITED - THOSE THAT CHANGE THE
- 20 OFFENSES CHARGED, OR ALTER AN INFORMATION TO ADD CHARGES
- 21 NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY
- 22 HEARING, PROSECUTION CHANGED CHARGE ~~INDICTMENT~~ VIOLATING
- 23 DEFENDANT'S 6TH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND RIGHT TO
- 24 MAKE A DEFENSE. A SHOWING OF BAD FAITH IS NOT REQUIRED FOR
- 25 PROSECUTORIAL MISSTATEMENTS OF LAW TO CONSTITUTE MISCONDUCT.
- 26 PEOPLE V. HILL (1998) 17 C. 4TH 800, 822, 829, 72 C.R. 2d 656, 952
- 27 P. 2d 673 SUPP. INFRA, § 581. PROSECUTION ALSO VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S 5TH + 14TH AMEND.
- 28 RIGHTS AS FEDERALLY GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION. DUE PROCESS + EQUAL PROTECTION



ARGUMENT

§ 29:3

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This means that a defendant has a right to present his defense and to call witnesses favorable to him without interference by the prosecutor or other agencies of government. The Supreme Court in several decisions has explored the meaning of the right to compulsory process. In *Washington v. Texas*, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967) in holding this right so fundamental as to be part of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated:

The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.

II

THE FEDERAL STANDARD OF MATERIALITY

The proper standard for determining whether a criminal charge must be dismissed due to state action depriving the defendant of a material witness is the federal standard, which requires a criminal defendant to show that the witness's testimony would have been material and favorable to his defense. Proposition 8 (Cal Const Art I § 28(d) prohibits the exclusion of relevant evidence in criminal proceedings except to the extent federal law compels exclusion. Because dismissal amounts to the exclusion of all evidence against a defendant, a motion for dismissal, based on being deprived of a material witness, triggers the application of the California constitutional provision, and thus the state standard, which did not require defendant's showing of the testimony's favorable nature, was abrogated. (*People v. Valencia*, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 267 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1990)) However, conflicting authority exists on which federal standard to apply.

A. U.S. v Valenzuela-Bernal Standard

In *People v. Valencia*, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 267 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1990) the court followed the most recent United States Supreme Court opinion dealing specifically with the proper federal standard of materiality applicable to the loss of a witness through state action, and held that the charges should not be dismissed unless the defendant "makes a plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to



the testimony of available witnesses." (U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982))

The Appellate Court reasoned that Trombetta and Valenzuela-Bernal addressed two different aspects of the state's duty to preserve exculpatory evidence. While Trombetta presented an in-depth discussion of the constitutional duty to preserve physical evidence, it was not, in the Appellate Court's opinion, intended to supersede Valenzuela-Bernal's examination of unavailable witnesses.

*destroyed loss 911 tapes recorded over cell phone*

#### B. California v Trombetta Standard

In People v. Lopez, 198 Cal. App. 3d 135, 243 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1988) the court held the standard of materiality to be applied to the loss of testimonial evidence is that of California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984). Under this standard the lost evidence is material for the purpose of sanctions if its exculpatory value was apparent before it was lost. "Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." (California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-489, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984))

The Lopez court declined to follow the Valenzuela-Bernal standard because that case is older than Trombetta, and because there was no indication in the opinion that the Supreme Court intended to announce a separate standard for the loss of testimonial evidence as distinguished from the loss of other evidence.

The California Supreme Court in addressing a claim that a prosecutor's failure to tape record the entire interview with a key prosecution witness deprived the defendant of substantial evidence, applied the federal standard of Trombetta without deciding which standard applied. (People v. Fauber, 2 Cal. 4th 792, 829, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 831 P.2d 249 (1992))

### III

#### THE SUFFICIENCY OF ANY REQUIRED SHOWING OF MATERIALITY

Even if this court adopts the Valenzuela-Bernal standard, the showing of materiality must be viewed liberally. ~~The United~~ *Eno Enob*



Dated: 9-23-07

ERIC W. BURTON #FO2720

Attorney for Defendant IN PRO PER

NOTES TO FORM Error

Authorities

- U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982)  
Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 852-853, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586, 464 P.2d 42 (1970)  
People v. Valencia, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 267 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1990)  
People v. Jenkins, 190 Cal. App. 3d 200, 235 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1987)  
People v. Lopez, 198 Cal. App. 3d 135, 243 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1988)

ARGUMENT Commentary Error Error - Statement of facts in support of petition

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." This means that a defendant has a right to present his defense and to call witnesses favorable to him without interference by the prosecutor or other agencies of government. If the state takes action that prevents the defendant from presenting an adequate defense in violation of his constitutional guarantees, the case may be dismissed in furtherance of justice. Such action includes causing a material witness to be unavailable to testify at trial. These situations most commonly arise when the state causes material witnesses to be deported (People v. Mejia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 574, 129 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1976)); or the police lose contact with a police informant (Eleazer v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 847, 852-853, 83 Cal. Rptr. 586, 464 P.2d 42 (1970)); or lose the records identifying a material civilian witness (People v. Gonzales, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1228, 257 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1989)).

Materiality standard: The defendant must show there was a reasonable possibility the unavailable witness could have offered favorable evidence on guilt or innocence. The defendant must meet the federal materiality standard contained in U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982), by making a "plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witness would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses." The less rigid rule of People v. Mejia, 57 Cal. App. 3d 574, 129 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1976), has been abrogated by Proposition 8, (Cal Const Art I § 28(d)) (People v. Valencia, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 819, 267 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1990)).

Sufficiency of showing: The United States Supreme Court recognized that in order to make a showing of materiality "the defendant cannot be expected to render a detailed description of their lost testimony" (U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982)). To make a showing, counsel may rely on statements by the lost witness to third parties, including those contained in police reports, or "the defendant's explanation under oath of such evidence would be an acceptable method of establishing the materiality of the missing witness." (People v. Valencia, 218 Cal. App. 3d 808, 824, 819, 267 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1990)) The showing must be based on "reasonable possibilities and not on sheer and unreasonable speculation." (People v. Jenkins, 190 Cal. App. 3d 200, 207, 235 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1987)) Because "the explanation of materiality is testimonial in nature, and constitutes evidence of the prejudice incurred as a result of (the loss of the witness), it should be verified by oath or affirmation."

10



The motion will be made on the ground that the defendant was committed without reasonable or probable cause because the commitment was based upon incompetent evidence.

The motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the memorandum of points and authorities served and filed herewith, ~~the transcript of the preliminary examination~~ *Enotely* on such supplemental memoranda of points and authorities as may be filed hereafter with the court, and on such oral argument as may be presented at the hearing on this motion.

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Attorney for Defendant

~~NOTES TO FORM~~ *Enotely*

**Authorities**

- Pen C §§ 995-999a, 1510
- Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 294 P.2d 23 (1956)
- People v. Scoma, 71 Cal. 2d 332, 335, 78 Cal. Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419 (1969)
- People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891, 897, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706 (1978)
- People v. Sherwin, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1404, 1408, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888 (2000)

**Commentary**

*1474* A defendant cannot be held to answer upon evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure. A defendant is held to answer without reasonable or probable cause within the meaning of § 995 when the only substantial evidence supporting his commitment has been obtained in violation of the ~~Fourth Amendment~~ (People v. Scoma, 71 Cal. 2d 332, 335, 78 Cal. Rptr. 491, 455 P.2d 419 (1969); People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891, 897, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706 (1978)) If a motion to suppress was made at the preliminary examination, the defendant has two methods of challenging the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. First, the Pen C § 1538.5 motion may be renewed in the superior court, on 10 days notice, but any evidence presented by the defense is restricted to the evidence contained in the transcript of the preliminary examination unless: (1) the parties agree otherwise; (2) a party has other evidence that could not have reasonably been presented at the preliminary examination; or (3) the People wish to recall a witness who had previously testified at the preliminary examination. (Pen C § 1538.5(i); People v. Hansel, 1 Cal. 4th 1211, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 824 P.2d 694 (1992))

Second, if a motion to suppress was made at the preliminary examination, the defendant may lodge a § 995 motion based upon the testimony contained in the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Penal Code § 1538.5(n) specifically states that "Nothing in this section shall be construed as altering . . . (5) the procedure and law relating to a motion made pursuant to Section 871.5 or 995, or the procedures which may be initiated after the granting or denial of such a motion."

**Magistrate's findings:** In ruling on a renewal of a suppression motion, the superior court independently decides the legal issues, but is bound by any factual findings made by the magistrate. (Pen C § 1538.5(i); People v.

(11)



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~~Memro, 11 Cal. 4th 786, 846, 12 Cal. 4th 783d, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 905 P.2d 1905 (1996). The reviewing judge must accept as true the evidence supporting the magistrate's decision. (People v. Lawler, 9 Cal. 3d 150, 160, 107 Cal. Rptr. 19, 507 P.2d 621 (1973)) The reviewing judge must determine independently whether the magistrate's application of the law to the facts was correct. (People v. Leyba, 29 Cal. 3d 591, 174 Cal. Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961 (1981))~~

~~Suppression motion must be made at preliminary: If the defense did not make a Pen C § 1598.5 suppression motion at the preliminary hearing, the evidence cannot be challenged by a § 995 motion. (People v. Anderson, 210 Cal. App. 3d 24, 28, 258 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1989))~~

#### Research References

Text References

C.J.S., Criminal Law §§ 770-798

West's Digest References

Criminal Law § 394

#### § 20:8 — Points and authorities

#### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF \_\_\_\_\_

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,	} Case No.: _____ POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE INFORMATION
Plaintiff,	
v	
_____,	Defendant.

Defendant submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion to set aside the information:

#### I

#### SUMMARY OF FACTS

[Counsel should set forth a summary of the evidence contained in the preliminary hearing transcript and the magistrate's findings of fact, if any.]

#### II

#### A DEFENDANT CANNOT BE HELD TO ANSWER IF DEFENDANT'S COMMITMENT IS BASED UPON INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE

An order to set aside an information pursuant to Pen C § 995 may be based upon a determination that the evidence to support the information was the product of an illegal search and seizure. (People v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. App. 2d 581, 586, 81 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1969)). "When the only substantial evidence supporting

**ARGUMENT**

the commitment has been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant is held to answer without reasonable or probable cause within the meaning of section 995 of the Penal Code." (People v. Whyte, 90 Cal. App. 3d 235, 240, 152 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1979)).

"[A] defendant has been held to answer without reasonable or probable cause if his commitment is based entirely on incompetent evidence," [citation omitted] and accordingly, in such a case the trial court should grant a motion to set aside the information. . . . No problem is presented in applying this rule in cases involving searches and seizures in which the facts bearing on the legality of the search and seizure are undisputed and establish as a matter of law that the evidence is or is not admissible. (Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 271, 294 P.2d 23 (1956)).

**NOTES TO FORM**

**Commentary**

~~Counsel should, of course, supplement the points and authorities with sections summarizing the testimony at the preliminary hearing and the applicable case law concerning the specific Fourth Amendment violation.~~ **PROTECT**

**Research References**

- Text References  
C.J.S., Criminal Law §§ 770-798
- West's Digest References  
Criminal Law §394

**§ 20:9 Inadmissable hearsay**

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF \_\_\_\_\_**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE  
OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

v

Defendant.

Case No.: \_\_\_\_\_  
NOTICE OF MOTION TO  
SET ASIDE INFORMATION  
(Pen C § 995)  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
Time: \_\_\_\_\_  
Place: \_\_\_\_\_

TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF \_\_\_\_\_ COUNTY  
AND/OR \_\_\_\_\_ [HIS OR HER] REPRESENTATIVE:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on \_\_\_\_\_ [date], at the hour  
of \_\_\_\_\_ or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in  
the courtroom of Department \_\_\_\_\_ of the above-entitled court,  
the defendant will move for an order setting aside the informa-  
tion filed herein.

The motion will be made on the grounds that the defendant  
was committed without reasonable or probable cause.

13

Executed on \_\_\_\_\_ [date], at \_\_\_\_\_, California.

Attorney for Defendant

### NOTES TO FORM

## Research References

### Text References

C.J.S., Criminal Law §§ 486, 510, 541-546, 1233, 1236

### West's Digest References

Criminal Law 700(9)

### § 29:6 — Points and authorities

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF \_\_\_\_\_

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF  
CALIFORNIA.

Plaintiff,

V

Defendant.

Case No.:

POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES  
IN SUPPORT OF ~~MOTION~~  
TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE

Defendant submits the following points and authorities in support of the motion for sanctions:

I

## DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED IF THE POLICE FAIL TO PRESERVE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE

In *California v. Trombetta*, 467 U.S. 479, 488-489, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984), the Supreme Court evaluated the government's duty to take affirmative steps to preserve physical evidence on behalf of defendants.

Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, ~~that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, [citation omitted],~~ ex-

ARGUMENT

1 ~~THE STATES~~ DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED WHEN A STATE FAILS  
2 TO FOLLOW ITS OWN ESTABLISHED CRIMINAL PROCEDURES AND  
3 VIOLATES ITS OWN STATUTES OR CONSTITUTION. HICKS V. OKLAHOMA  
4 (1980) 447 U.S. 343 [100 S. Ct. 2 839, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115]. THE STATES  
5 VIOLATIONS OF ITS OWN EVIDENTIARY RULES RESULTED IN A DENIAL  
6 OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS. ESTELLE V. MCGUIRE (1991) 502  
7 U.S. 62, 70 [112 S. Ct. 475, 481; 116 L. Ed. 2d 385].  
8 AMENDMENT XIV SECTION I - ALL PERSONS BORN OR NATURALIZED IN THE  
9 UNITED STATES AND SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION THEREOF, ARE CITIZENS OF  
10 THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE WHEREIN THEY RESIDE. NO STATE  
11 SHALL MAKE OR ENFORCE ANY LAW WHICH SHALL ABRIDGE THE  
12 PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
13 NOR SHALL ANY STATE DEPRIVE ANY PERSON OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR  
14 PROPERTY, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, NOR DENY TO ANY  
15 PERSON WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF  
16 THE LAWS. "ARTICLE IV SECTION 4. PROTECTION OF STATES  
17 GUARANTEED - THE UNITED STATES SHALL GUARANTEE TO  
18 EVERY STATE IN THIS UNION A PUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT,  
19 AND SHALL PROTECT EACH OF THEM AGAINST INVASION AND  
20 ON APPLICATION OF THE LEGISLATURE, OR OF THE EXECUTIVE  
21 (WHEN THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT BE CONVENED) AGAINST  
22 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO  
23 NOTICE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, PEOPLE V. PERCELLE, 126  
24 CAL. APP 164, 23 CAL. RPTR. 3d 731 (6TH DIST 2005). [ARTICLE I SECTION  
25 7(A) A PERSON MAY NOT BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY  
26 WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW OR DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION  
27 OF THE LAWS. See PEOPLE V. BATTIS (2003)  
28 ARRESTED ON 8/13/04 3064TH 606 697 104 S. Ct. 2d 67, 491. 3d 357, 1 CAL. CRIM. LAW 3d 429, 127.

15



Conflict of Interest

West's annotated California Codes

Government Code

Title 9. Political Reform

Chapter 1. General

§ 81008. Public records, inspection  
and reproduction, time, charge.

(a) Every report and statement filed  
pursuant to this title is a public record  
open for public inspection and reproduction  
during regular business hours

Right to representation by counsel  
Code of Civ. Proc. § 1282.4

Disclose Discovery Cases.  
Thickles

Marcus Houston Petelony

United States

No. 03-5165

May 24, 2004

1 ARGUMENT

2 SEE BANKS V. DRETKE (2004 540 U.S. 668, 1245 S.Ct. 1256,  
3 1275, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166, 1193 -

4 [EMPHASIZING SPECIAL ROLE OF PROSECUTOR IN SEARCH  
5 FOR TRUTH IN CRIMINAL TRIALS; COURTS, LITIGANTS, AND  
6 JURIES PROPERLY ANTICIPATE THAT PROSECUTION  
7 WILL REFRAIN FROM IMPROPER METHODS TO SECURE  
8 CONVICTION]. AFTER AN INDICTMENT HAS BEEN RETURNED  
9 AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS ARE UNDERWAY THE  
10 INDICTMENT'S CHARGES MAY NOT BE BROADENED BY AMENDMENTS  
11 EITHER LITERAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE EXCEPT BY THE  
12 GRAND JURY ITSELF. U.S. V. ADAMSON, 291 F.3d 606  
13 (9TH CIR. 2002)

14 AS THE EXCERPTS SHOW, PROSECUTION'S ARRAIGNMENT  
15 OF DEFENDANT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE ON AMENDED  
16 CHARGES, WAS DONE TO GAIN AN UNFAIR TACTICAL  
17 ADVANTAGE OVER DEFENDANT, AS DEFENSE COUNSEL  
18 ADAIR WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN NOTICE PRIOR  
19 TO TRIAL, DEFENDANT WAS NOT, IN ADDITION HAD BEEN  
20 DENIED HIS FEDERALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO BE  
21 PRESENT IN COURT, BOTH IN OR ABOUT 14 MARCH 05,  
22 WHEN THE CASE WAS TRIAL WITHOUT PETITIONER BEING  
23 GIVEN NOTICE, AND ON OR ABOUT 16 JUNE 05, AND PETITIONER  
24 BELIEVES PERHAPS ALSO ON OR ABOUT JAN-16-05?.

25 PROSECUTION, AFTER A DEFENSE MOTION HAD BEEN  
26 FILED AND SERVED ON D.A. HANNAH WITH NO ALLEGED  
27 RESPONSE, AND REBUTTED BY PROSECUTOR MR. TROCHA  
28 ON R. TEXCERP 329, FAILED TO DISCLOSE KIAH MINCEY,  
29 AN ALLEGED VICTIM, NOT ON PROSECUTION'S TRIAL  
30 WITNESS LIST. DEFENDANT NOT GIVEN PRIOR OPPORTUNITY  
31 TO CROSS EXAMINE A KIAH MINCEY, PROSECUTION  
32 FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE TRIER OF FACT TO DEFENSE, AS A  
33 MATERIAL WITNESS OF FACT ON STIPULATED COURT  
34 GENUINE BUSINESS COURT CLERK RECORDS, AND  
35 U.S. SHERIFF'S MARSHALL RECORDS AS THE HON. L. HALGA  
36 SIGNED OFF ON THE ~~RE~~TRAINING ORDER,

MR. F. W. BURTON #FO272C  
P.O. BOX 5246, CSATF/SP, CM 32C  
COR CORAN, CA. 93212  
IN PROPER

1 AND ISSUED A TRO PROTECTING PETITIONER MR. BURTON  
2 AND HIS MINOR DAUGHTER DREANA BURTON FROM MR. THOMAS  
3 ALLEGED VICTIM, AS MR. THOMAS WAS SHOWN STALKING  
4 PETITIONER ON OR ABOUT 23 FEB 04 IN PRESENCE OF  
5 HON. JUDGE HALBREN, AND MR. THOMAS WAS SERVED  
6 BY HER BALIFF, OF WHICH ALSO PROSECUTION FAILED  
7 TO DISCLOSE, THUS VIOLATING PETITIONER'S FEDERALLY  
8 GUARANTEED U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL 14TH AMENDMENT DUE  
9 PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES INCLUDING  
10 FEDERALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO NOTICE, AND COMPULSORY  
11 PROCESS. PETITIONER WAS PREVENTED BY TRIAL  
12 JUDGE FROM MAKING ANY MOTIONS OR OBJECTIONS.  
13 AS DEFENSE COUNSEL ADAIR FAILED TO OBJECT  
14 TO PETITIONER RECEIVING A CONVICTION AND SENTENCE  
15 OF A CUMULATIVE UNCHARGED UNPROVEN ALLEGED CRIME  
16 AGAINST A KIAH MINCEY, PETITIONER HAD NO PRIOR  
17 OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THIS DEPORTED WITNESS.  
18 FURTHERMORE PROSECUTION FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO  
19 DEFENSE AFTER A DISCOVERY MOTION HAD BEEN FILED  
20 TO DISCLOSE THAT MR. KIAH MINCEY RESIDENT OF THE  
21 FALSELY ALLEGED CRIME SCENE WAS A CONVICTED  
22 FELON, WHO WAS A LITIGANT REPRESENTING THE  
23 VISUALLY IMPAIRED IN A CLASS ACTION SUIT AGAINST  
24 A CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR. THIS QUESTION'S THE  
25 WHOLE CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION'S CASE OF BY  
26 WHICH FALSE EVIDENCE OF A BLACK PHONE WITH  
27 CONTAMINANT ALLEGED TO BE HELD BY MR. THOMAS, OF WHOM  
28 ALLEGEDLY RAN INSIDE MR. MINCEY'S RESIDENCE AFTER HIS  
29 ALLEGED ACCIDENT ON THE DAY IN QUESTION. MR. THOMAS  
30 TESTIFIED THAT MR. MINCEY GAVE HIM INSTRUMENTS  
31 TO HARASS ALLEGED DEFENDANT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT  
32 MR. MINCEY AND MR. THOMAS WERE IN PRISON TOGETHER  
33 AT CHUCAWALA STATE PRISON, PROSECUTION FAILED TO  
34 DISCLOSE FAVORABLE EVIDENCE OF MR. MINCEY'S CRIMINAL  
35 HISTORY AFTER A DEFENSE MOTION FOR DISCOVERY HAD  
36 BEEN FILED. THE SUBSEQUENT TRIAL OF DEFENDANT



WILSON, JEFFREY  
P.O. BOX 5246 COATSFORD, CA 93212  
COCORAN, CA 93212 IMPROPER

AS IN NEWBERRY SUPRA, AS QUOTED IN ILLINOIS V. FISHER CITE AS 124 S. CT. 1200 (2004) VIOLATED PETITIONERS FEDERALLY GUARANTEED 14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

SEE- ILLINOIS V. NEWBERRY 166 ILL. 2D 310, 209 ILL. DEC. 748, 652 N.E. 2D 298 (1995) THE APPELLATE COURT REASONED "WHERE EVIDENCE ENVELOP - SUBSEQUENT TO A DISCOVERY MOTION BY THE DEFENDANT APP. TO PET. FOR CERT 13, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT "THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO [540 U.S. 547] INDICATE THAT THE ALLEGED COCAINE WAS DESTROYED IN BAD FAITH" ID AT 15 THE COURT FURTHER DETERMINED THAT NEWBERRY DICTATED DISMISSAL BECAUSE, UNLIKE IN YOUNG BLOOD THE DESTROYED EVIDENCE PROVIDED RESPONDENTS "ONLY HOPE FOR EXONERATION" APP. TO PET. FOR CERT - 124 S. CT. 1202. "WE HAVE HELD THAT WHEN THE STATE SUPPRESSES OR FAILS TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, THE GOOD OR BAD FAITH OF THE PROSECUTION IS WITH HELD. SEE BRADY V. MARYLAND 373 U.S. 83 S. CT. 1194, 10 L. ED. 2D 215 (1963); US V. AGURS, 427, U.S. 97, 96 S. CT. 2392, 49 L. ED. 2D 342 (1976).

IN ADDITION THE POLICE DESTRUCTION OF THE ALLEGED 911 TAPES, AS PROSECUTION ALLEGED INADVERTENTLY DESTROYED. PETITIONER CONTENTS THAT THE TAPES WERE DESTROYED SUBSEQUENT TO HIS DEFENSE MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY BOTH INFORMAL BY LETTER OF MR. PLUMMERS REQUESTING TAPES ON 7-06-04 APPROX. AND HIS MOTION FOR DISCOVERY SERVED ON MS. HANNAH, YET NEVER HEARD, TAKEN OFF CALENDAR WITHOUT WRITTEN NOTICE TO DEFENDANT. THE HON. JUDGE PRECKEL'S DENIAL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT TO AN IN CAMERA HEARING BOTH BY MOTION OF DEFENDANT AND COUNSEL AT THE 1538.5 HEARING DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF HIS FEDERALLY GUARANTEED 14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.



1 ARGUMENT-PETITIONER WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO NOTICE  
 2 AND PRIOR OPPORTUNITY TO CROSS EXAMINE ALLEGED  
 3 VICTIM KATH WINCEY THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO DISCLOSE  
 4 AT TRIAL, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS 5TH AND 14TH AMEND.  
 5 DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES- SEE  
 6 CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. CT. 1334, 1365,  
 7 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 184, 3 CAL EVIDENCE.

8 STATEMENT OF FACTS- THE DEPORTATION OF THE HON. JUDGE  
 9 HALGREN'S TESTIMONIAL ON GENUINE COURT OFFICIAL  
 10 BUSINESS RECORDS VIOLATED PETITIONERS FEDERALLY GUAR-  
 11 ANTEED 14TH AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL  
 12 PROTECTION CLAUSES, AND RIGHT TO MAKE A DEFENSE,  
 13 AND VIOLATED PETITIONERS FEDERALLY GUARANTEED  
 14 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL AS  
 15 GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

16 ~~STATEMENT OF FACTS~~ <sup>DEFENSE</sup> ARGUMENT

17 ACCORDINGLY, THE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR PREJUDICE FINDS IT'S  
 18 ROOTS IN THE TEXT FOR MATERIALITY OF EXCULPATORY  
 19 INFORMATION NOT DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENSE BY THE PROSECUTION,  
 20 UNITED STATES V. AGURS, 427 U.S., AT 104, 112-113, 96 S. CT., AT 2397, 2401-  
 21 2402, AND IN THE TEST FOR MATERIALITY OF TESTIMONY MADE  
 22 UNAVAILABLE TO THE DEFENSE BY GOVERNMENT DEPORTATION OF A  
 23 WITNESS, UNITED STATES V. VALENZUELA-BERNAL, SUPRA, 458 U.S., AT  
 24 872-874, 102 S. CT., AT 3449-3450. E.G. HON. JUDGE LAURA HALGREN  
 25 ON GENUINE COURT BUSINESS RECORDS AND U.S. MARSHALL'S  
 26 SERVICE BUSINESS RECORDS. SEE CODE. CIV. PROC. § 2033.280; CODE  
 27 CIV. PROC. § 2031.010; CODE CIV. PROC. § 2031.020; CODE CIV. PROC. § 2032.  
 28 250. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2017.010



## CONTENTION

~~EMOTIONAL GROUNDS~~ VIOLATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 14TH AMENDMENT BOTH  
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES FOR PROSECUTIONS  
(ACCUSATIONAL DELAY, DENIAL OF RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL)  
DELAY AND CHANGING, BEFORE ACCUSATION, DENIAL OF RIGHT TO  
CHARGING INDICTMENT  
NOTICE AND SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT BY ARRAINING DEFENDANT ON AN  
AMENDED COMPLAINT ON THE DAY OF TRIAL TO GAIN AN UNFAIR  
TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER PETITIONER.

STATEMENT OF FACTS ON JUNE 16<sup>TH</sup> 05, PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY  
ADAIR WAS PRESENT IN COURT FOR REARRAIGNMENT, PETITIONER WAS  
DENIED HIS FEDERALLY GUARANTEED 14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND  
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT TO DEFEND AND  
TESTIFY AND DENIED HIS RIGHT TO NOTICE - PETITIONER ARRAIGNED DAY OF TRIAL - PROS  
ARGUMENT -

UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

SEE THE PARKER FACTORS - BARKER V. WINGO (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct.  
2182, 33 L.Ed. 2d 101, TEXT, P. 423 FEDERAL BALANCING TEST

SEE ALSO PEOPLE V. ANDERSON (2001) 25 C. 4TH 543, 603, 604, 106 C.R. 2d  
575, 22 P.3d 347 [DEFENDANT ASSERTION OF SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT  
(THIRD PARKER FACTOR) IS "ENTITLED TO STRONG EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT"  
ON ISSUE WHETHER DEFENDANT IS BEING DEPRIVED OF THAT RIGHT  
BECAUSE "[T]HE MORE SERIOUS THE DEPRIVATION, THE MORE LIKELY A  
DEFENDANT IS TO COMPLAIN". WEST KEY NUMBER DIGEST CRIM. LAW. 577.10(1)

AS QUOTED IN FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA CITE AS 955. CT. 2525 (1975) THIS COURT HAS  
OFTEN RECOGNIZED THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATURE OF RIGHTS THAT,  
THOUGH NOT LITERALLY EXPRESSED IN THE DOCUMENT, ARE ESSENTIAL  
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN A FAIR ADVERSARY PROCESS. IT IS NOW  
ACCEPTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT AN ACCUSED HAS A RIGHT TO BE  
PRESENT AT ALL STAGES OF THE TRIAL WHERE HIS ABSENCE

1 MIGHT FRUSTRATE THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROCEEDINGS, SNYDER V.  
2 MASSACHUSETTS, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S. CT. 330, 78 L. ED. 674, TO TESTIFY ON  
3 HIS OWN BEHALF, SEE HARRIS V. NEW YORK, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S. CT. 643,  
4 645, 28 L. ED. 2d 1; BROOKS V. TENNESSEE, 406 U.S. 605, 612, 92 S. CT. 1891, 1895, 32  
5 L. ED. 2d 358; cf. FERGUSON V. GEORGIA, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S. CT. 756, 5 L. ED. 2d  
6 783 AND TO BE CONVICTED ONLY IF HIS GUILT IS PROVED BEYOND A  
7 REASONABLE DOUBT, IN re WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. CT. 1068, 25 L. ED. 2d 368;  
8 MULLANEY V. WILBUR, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. CT. 1881, 44 L. ED. 2d 508.  
9 BECAUSE THESE RIGHTS ARE BASIC TO OUR ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL  
10 JUSTICE, THEY ARE PART OF THE "DUE PROCEW OF LAW" THAT IS GUARANTEED  
11 BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS  
12 OF THE STATES, THE RIGHTS TO NOTICE, CONFRONTATION, AND COMPULSORY  
13 PROCESS, WHEN TAKEN TOGETHER, GUARANTEE THAT A CRIMINAL CHARGE  
14 MAY BE ANSWERED IN A MANNER NOW CONSIDERED FUNDAMENTAL TO  
15 THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE — THROUGH THE CALLING  
16 AND INTERROGATION OF FAVORABLE WITNESSES, THE CROSS-EXAMINATION  
17 OF ADVERSE WITNESSES, AND THE ORDERLY INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE.  
18 IN SHORT, THE AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONALIZES THE RIGHT IN AN ADVERSARY  
19 CRIMINAL TRIAL TO MAKE A DEFENSE AS WE KNOW IT. SEE CALIFORNIA V.  
20 GREEN, 399 U.S. 149, 176, 90 S. CT. 1930, 1944, 26 L. ED. 2d 489 (HARLAN J.,  
21 CONCURRING), THE SIXTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE MERELY THAT A  
22 DEFENSE SHALL BE MADE FOR THE ACCUSED; IT GRANTS TO THE ACCUSED  
23 PERSONALLY THE RIGHT TO MAKE HIS DEFENSE. IT IS THE ACCUSED, NOT  
24 COUNSEL, WHO MUST BE "INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE  
25 ACCUSATION," WHO MUST BE "CONFRONTED WITH THE WITNESSES  
26 AGAINST HIM," AND WHO MUST BE ACCORDED "COMPULSORY PROCESS  
27 FOR OBTAINING WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR". ALTHOUGH NOT STATED  
28 IN THE AMENDMENT IN SO MANY WORDS, THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION—  
29 TO MAKE ONE'S OWN DEFENSE PERSONALLY—IS THUS IMPLIED BY THE

22

STRUCTURE OF THE AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT TO DEFEND IS GIVEN DIRECTLY TO THE ACCUSED; FOR IT IS HE WHO SUFFERS THE CONSEQUENCES IF THE DEFENSE FAILS, THE COUNSEL PROVISION SUPPLEMENTS HIS DESIGN. IT SPEAKS OF THE "ASSISTANCE" OF COUNSEL, AND AN ASSISTANT, HOWEVER EXPERT, IS STILL AN ASSISTANT. THE LANGUAGE AND SPIRIT OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT CONTEMPLATE THAT COUNSEL, LIKE THE OTHER DEFENSE TOOLS GUARANTEED BY THE AMENDMENT, SHALL BE AN AID TO A WILLING DEFENDANT - NOT AN ORGAN OF THE STATE INTERPOSED BETWEEN AN UNWILLING DEFENDANT AND HIS RIGHT TO DEFEND HIMSELF PERSONALLY. TO THRUST COUNSEL UPON THE ACCUSED, AGAINST HIS CONSIDERED WISH, THUS VIOLATES THE LOGIC OF THE AMENDMENT. IN SUCH CASE, COUNSEL IS NOT AN ASSISTANT, BUT A MASTER; AND THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DEFENSE IS STRIPPED OF THE PERSONAL CHARACTER UPON WHICH THE AMENDMENT INSISTS. AN UNWANTED COUNSEL "REPRESENTS" THE DEFENDANT ONLY THROUGH A TENUOUS AND UNACCEPTABLE LEGAL FICTION. UNLESS THE ACCUSED HAS ACQUIESCED IN SUCH REPRESENTATION, THE DEFENSE PRESENTED IS NOT THE DEFENSE GUARANTEED HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION, FOR, IN A VERY REAL SENSE, IT IS NOT HIS DEFENSE. IN U.S. V. PLATTNER, 330 F.2d 1271, THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT EMPHASIZED THAT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT GRANTS THE ACCUSED THE RIGHTS OF CONFRONTATION, OF COMPULSORY PROCESS FOR WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR, AND OF ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS MINIMUM PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE COURT CONCLUDED, WAS INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT THE OTHER RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT, AND NOT TO IMPAIR "THE ABSOLUTE ANY PRIMARY RIGHT TO CONDUCT ONE'S OWN DEFENSE IN PROPRIA PERSONA". Id., AT 274. THE COURT FOUND SUPPORT FOR IT'S DECISION IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE 1789 FEDERAL STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SEE



STATUTES - U.S.C. §1654, AND FED. RULE CRIM. PROC. 44;

~~AND~~ IN THE MANY STATE CONSTITUTIONS THAT EXPRESSLY GUARANTEE  
SELF-REPRESENTATION, AND IN THIS COURT'S RECOGNITION OF THE  
RIGHT IN ADAMS AND PRICE, ON THE GROUNDS THE COURT OF APPEALS  
HELD THAT IMPLICIT IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF DUE  
PROCESS OF LAW, AND IMPLICIT ALSO IN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S  
GUARANTEE OF A RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IS "THE RIGHT  
OF THE ACCUSED PERSONALLY TO MANAGE AND CONDUCT HIS OWN  
DEFENSE IN A CRIMINAL CASE," 330 F.2d. AT 274. "IN ALL CRIMINAL  
PROSECUTIONS, THE ACCUSED SHALL ENJOY THE RIGHT... TO BE  
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION;

1. ARGUMENT

2. SEE IN ILLINOIS V. GREGORY FISHER. NO. 03-374 (2-23-2004)

3. CITE AS 124 S.Ct. 1200 (2004) —

4. THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED THE CONVICTION,

5. HOLDING THAT THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRED

6. DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE RELYING ON THE ILLINOIS

7. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ILLINOIS V. NEWBERRY 166

8. ILL. 2d, 310, 209 ILL DEC. 748, 652 N.E. 2d 288 (1995)

9. THE APPELLATE COURT REASONED:

10. WHERE EVIDENCE IS REQUESTED BY THE DEFENSE

11. IN A DISCOVERY MOTION, THE STATE IS ON NOTICE

12. THAT THE EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESERVED, AND THE

13. DEFENSE IS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDANT

14. SHOWING THAT THE EVIDENCE HAS EXCULPATORY

15. VALUE IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A DUE PROCESS

16. VIOLATION. IF THE STATE PROCEEDS TO DESTROY

17. THE EVIDENCE, APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS MAY

18. BE IMPOSED EVEN IF THE DESTRUCTION IS

19. INADVERTENT. NO SHOWING OF BAD FAITH IS

20. NECESSARY." APP. TO PET. FOR CERT. 12 (QUOTING

21. NEWBERRY, SUPRA, AT 317, 209 ILL. DEC. AT 752,

22. 652 N.E. 2d, AT 292.) ~~(CITATION OBLITERATED)~~

23. THE APPELLATE COURT OBSERVED THAT NEWBERRY

24. DISTINGUISHED OUR DECISION IN YOUNG BLOOD ON THE GROUND

25. THAT THE POLICE IN YOUNG BLOOD DID NOT DESTROY EVIDENCE

26. SUBSEQUENT TO A DISCOVERY MOTION BY THE DEFENDANT.

27. APP. TO PET. FOR CERT. 13

28. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENT "WAS

29. DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN HE WAS TRIED SUBSEQUENT TO

30. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ALLEGED COCAINE." APP. TO PET. FOR CERT

31. 16. THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT DENIED LEAVE TO APPEAL.

32. THE ALLEGED INADVERTENT DESTRUCTION OF 911 TAPES

33. BY THE E.C. POLICE AFTER A FILED AND SERVED DEFENSE

34. MOTION FOR DISCOVERY VIOLATED PETITIONERS 14TH U.S. CONST

35. AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

MR. E.W. BURTON #F02720  
P.O. BOX 5216 CSAT/19/CP/1322  
CORCORAN, CA 93212

ARGUMENT

PETITIONER HAVING NO PRIOR CONVICTION, AND AFTER  
BEING ACQUITTED IN A CLOSE CASE OF COUNTY  
WITHOUT NOTICE AND WITHOUT PRIOR OPPORTUNITY  
TO CROSS EXAMINE AN UNDISCLOSED KATH MINCEY  
AFTER A DISCOVERY MOTION HAD BEEN FILED PURSUANT  
TO BRADY V. MARYLAND SUPRA, THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO  
RESPOND TO, A DEFENSE MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, SUBSEQUENT  
TO TRIAL AND SENTENCING, DEFENDANT WAS TAKEN BY  
SURPRISE AND PREVENTED FROM RAISING ANY MOTIONS OR  
OBJECTIONS BY THE TRIAL JUDGE AND DEFENSE COUNSEL  
FAILED TO GIVE DEFENDANT NOTICE AND FAILED TO OBJECT  
PETITIONER RECEIVED A CUMULATIVE PENALTY WITHOUT BEING  
CHARGED OR PROVEN OF THE ALLEGATIONS, SEE KILBOURN  
V. STATE, 9 CONN. 560, 563, 1833 WL 68 (1833) AS QUOTED  
IN APPENDIX NEW JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466 - "NO PERSON  
OUGHT TO BE, OR CAN BE, SUBJECTED TO A CUMULATIVE  
PENALTY, WITHOUT BEING CHARGED WITH A CUMULATIVE  
OFFENCE" HINES V. STATE, 26 GA. 614, 616, 1859  
WL 41 (1859) (REVERCING ENHANCED SENTENCE  
IMPOSED BY TRIAL JUDGE AND EXPLAINING [T]HE QUESTION,  
WHETHER THE OFFENCE WAS A SECOND ONE, OR NOT, WAS A  
QUESTION FOR THE JURY... THE ALLEGATION [OF A PRIOR  
OFFENCE] IS CERTAINLY ONE OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE TO  
THE ACCUSED FOR IF IT IS TRUE, HE BECOMES SUBJECT  
TO A GREATLY INCREASED PUNISHMENT"). ENACTMENT  
OF CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE REFORM ACT DID NOT  
ALTER TRIAL COURT'S TASK OF WEIGHING



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES	PAGE NUMBER
2348, 530 U.S. 466, APPENDIX V. NEW JERSEY, U.S. NJ (2000)	
UPON GRANTING CERTIORARI, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT	
JUSTICE STEVENS HELD THAT (1) OTHER THAN FACT OF PRIOR CONVICTION	THERE WAS NO PRIOR CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT
ANY FACT THAT INCREASES PENALTY FOR CRIME BEYOND PRESCRIBED	RELATED TO CRIMES
STATUTORY MAXIMUM MUST BE SUBMITTED TO JURY AND PROVED BEYOND	OF
REASONABLE DOUBT AND (2) STATE HATE CRIME STATUTE WHICH	
AUTHORIZED INCREASE IN MAXIMUM PRISON SENTENCE BASED	
ON JUDGES FINDING BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT	
ACTED WITH PURPOSE TO INTIMIDATE VICTIM BASED ON PARTICULAR	
CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTIM VIOLATED DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.	
THE DEFENDANT MUST HAVE HEARD AND UNDERSTOOD THE ACCUSATION AND MUST HAVE HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT IT BEFORE THE	
STATUTES AND RULES SUCH AN ADMISSION.	
U.S. CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT 14, U.S. CONST AMEND 4 <sup>TH</sup> , 5 <sup>TH</sup> , 6 <sup>TH</sup> , 8 <sup>TH</sup>	
U.S. V. AGURS (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 49 L Ed 342, 96 S Ct. 2392.	
<del>CENTIN V. UNITED STATES (1997), 17 F.3d 67, AND OTHER L.A. ADMISSIBILITY OF VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS</del>	
<del>AND IN THE PRESENCE OF ACCUSED AND NOT PERIOD OF CONDUCTED AT H.M. 80 ALR 1225</del>	
GRIFFIN V. CALIFORNIA (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 14 L Ed 2d 166, 95 S Ct 1229, ARANDA V. CALIFORNIA (1966) 394 U.S. 436, 12 L Ed 2d 459, 88 S Ct 1352	
CODE CIV. PROC. § 2033.280 AS ADDED IN 2004, PROVIDE IN PART THAT, IF A PARTY	
TO WHOM REQUEST FOR ADMISSION ARE DIRECTED FAILS TO SERVE A TIMELY	
RESPONSE, THAT PARTY WAIVES ANY OBJECTION TO THE REQUEST UNLESS RELIEVED OF THIS WAIVER	
BY THE COURT UNDER SPECIFIED CIRCUMSTANCES.	
CODE CIV. PROC. § 2033.280 AS ADDED IN 2004, PROVIDES IN PART THAT, THE PARTY REQUESTING	
ADMISSIONS MAY MOVE FOR AN ORDER THAT THE GENUINENESS OF ANY DOCUMENTS AND THE	
TRUTH OF ANY MATTERS SPECIFIED IN THE REQUESTS BE DEEMED ADMITTED AS WELL	
FOR MONETARY SANCTION, THE COURT MUST MAKE THIS ORDER UNLESS IT FINDS THAT THE PARTY HAS PROPOSED	
OTHER	
A RESPONSE THAT IS IN SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.	
"BREAK IN CUSTODY" THE NO RECONTACT RULE, EDWARDS V. ARIZONA (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 101 S Ct. 1838, 68 L Ed 2d 378, 83-2	
UNITED STATES V. CRONIC - (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 104 S Ct. 2039, 80 L Ed 2d 657,	
HOLLOWAY V. ARKANSAS SUPRA - CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 6, ADDED	
ABSENCE OF COUNSEL	



1 GOVERNMENTS CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST DEFENDANTS  
2 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO PRESENT DEFENSE IN CASES  
3 INVOLVING REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY OF INFORMATION  
4 OTHERWISE SUBJECT TO OFFICIAL INFORMATION PRIVILEGE.

5 U.S. CONST. AMEND 6; PEN CODE §§ 1054 et seq; EVID. CODE §§ 1040,  
6 PEOPLE V. JACKSON 110 CAL APP 4TH 280, 1 CAL RPTR 3d 561 (STRIST  
7 2003). IN CONSIDERING THE ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF  
8 HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING THE GOVERNING  
9 REGULATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INVOLVED AND APPLICABLE  
10 STATUTES MUST BE APPLIED AND ENFORCED. JACOBOWITZ V. U.S. CT

11 CI 1976, 424 F.2d 555, 191 Ct. Cl. 444 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND  
12 PROCEDURE 461. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES WRITTEN DECISION  
13 DENYING MINOR BENEFITS FOR CHILDHOOD ASTHMA UNDER SUPPLE-  
14 MENTAL SECURITY INSURANCE (SSI) PROGRAM FAILED TO IDENTIFY  
15 WHAT EVIDENCE OR INFERENCE JUSTIFIED DETERMINATION THAT  
16 MINORS ASTHMA WAS NOT SEVERE ENOUGH TO MEET  
17 MEDICAL LISTING FOR CHILDHOOD ASTHMA, AND THUS,  
18 REMAND WAS REQUIRED FOR EXPLANATION OF FINDINGS.

19 BROWN EX. REL MC CURRY V. APFEL, CA. 4 (MC) 2001, 11  
20 FED. APPX. 58, 2001 WL 305834, UNREPORTED. SOCIAL  
21 SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE § 149

22 PUBLIC AGENCY'S VIOLATION OF PRIVACY ACT THROUGH SUPERVISORS  
23 ACTIONS DURING INVESTIGATION INTO RUMOR REGARDING  
24 UNAUTHORIZED TRIP TAKEN BY EMPLOYEE, IN WHICH SUPERVISORS  
25 SOUGHT INFORMATION THROUGH THIRD PARTIES RATHER THAN  
26 COLLECTING INFORMATION DIRECTLY FROM EMPLOYEE WAS  
27 WILLFUL AND INTENTIONAL FOR PURPOSES OF DAMAGES WHERE  
28 AGENCY AND IT'S TOP MANAGEMENT WERE AWARE THAT

1 THEY WERE SUBJECT TO ACT YET TOOK NO ACTION TO  
2 INFORM OTHER EMPLOYEES OF THIS INFORMATION AND  
3 MADE NO EFFORT TO EDUCATE OR INSTRUCT EMPLOYEES  
4 ABOUT PROCEDURES AND SUBSTANCE OF ACT. DONG V. SMITH-  
5 SONIAN INST. D.D.C. 1996, 943 F. SUPP. 69 RECORDS & 31,  
6 RECORD OF INVESTIGATION (ROI) OF AUTO MOBILE ACCIDENT,  
7 WHICH OCCURED IN GERMANY, INVOLVING MILITARY  
8 DEPENDENT AND GERMAN CITIZEN WHO DIED AS A RES-  
9 ULT OF ACCIDENT, CONTAINED INFORMATION THAT WAS NOT  
10 SUFFICIENTLY ACCURATE OR COMPLETE SO AS TO ENSURE  
11 IT'S FAIRNESS TO DEPENDENT, AS WOULD SUPPORT AMEND-  
12 MENT OF ROI PURSUANT TO PRIVACY ACT; ROI'S SUBJECT  
13 BLOCK CONTAINED DEPENDENT'S FULL NAME, BIRTH DATE,  
14 ADDRESS, AND NOTATIONS "FATAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENT" AND  
15 NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE" WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION  
16 THAT DEPENDENT WAS NEVER FOUND GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE  
17 AND SUCH INFORMATION WAS SUBJECT TO DISSEMINATION.  
18 HOLZ V. WESTPHAL, D.D.C. 2002, 217 F. SUPP. 2d 50.  
19 RECORD & 31; ARMY'S REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (ROI) OF  
20 MILITARY DEPENDENT FOLLOWING MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT IN WHICH  
21 18 YEAR-OLD DEPENDENT WAS DRIVER AND GERMAN CITIZEN WAS  
22 KILLED WAS NOT CONNECTED TO POSSIBLE SECURITY RISK  
23 OR VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW, AS WOULD SUPPORT ARMY'S  
24 DENIAL OF DEPENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AMENDMENT OF RECORD TO  
25 ELIMINATE HIS NAME; THE ROI ITSELF EXPRESSLY ACKNOWLEDGED  
26 THAT THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISIONS (CID) LACKED AUTHOR-  
27 ITY TO INVESTIGATE THE ACCIDENT, AS DEPENDENT WAS CIVILIAN  
28 AND NO FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTES WERE VIOLATED. HOLZ V. WE-  
29 STPHAL, D.D.C 2002, 217 F. SUPP. 2d 50 ARMED SERVICES & 4  
30

1 ARGUMENT

2 SEE HOLMES V. SOUTH CAROLINA (2006) 126 S. CT. 1727, 540 U.S. 319,  
3 164 L. ED. 2D 503, 74 USLW 4221 HOLDING THE UNITED STATES  
4 SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ALITO, HELD THAT EXCLUSION OF  
5 DEFENSE EVIDENCE THIRD PARTY GUILT DENIED DEFENDANT OF  
6 A FAIR TRIAL ABROGATING STATE V. GAY, 343 S. C. 543, 541 S. E. 2D  
7 541 VACATED AND REMANDED.  
8 WHILE PRIOR (ALLEGED) OFFENCE EVIDENCE MAY IN A PROPER  
9 CASE BE ADMISSIBLE FOR IMPEACHMENT EVEN IF FOR NO OTHER  
10 PURPOSE, THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ADMITTING  
11 EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES AND CONSEQUENTLY  
12 NO BASIS FOR DISTRICT COURT'S SUGGESTION THAT  
13 JURORS COULD CONSIDER THE (ALLEGED) PRIOR CONVICTION  
14 AS IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE WHERE DEFENDANT DID  
15 NOT TESTIFY AT TRIAL. FED. RULES EVID. RULE 609, 28  
16 U.S. CA. CRIMINAL LAW K 309.1; MOST TELLING OF MONGE'S  
17 DISTANCE FROM THE ISSUE AT STAKE IN THIS CASE IS THAT THE  
18 DOUBLE JEOPARDY QUESTION IN MONGE AROUSE BECAUSE THE  
19 STATE HAD FAILED TO SATISFY IT'S OWN STATUTORY BURDEN  
20 OF PROVING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE  
21 DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A (ALLEGED) PRIOR OFFENSE (AND WAS  
22 THEREFORE SUBJECT TO AN ENHANCED, RECIDIVISM-BASED  
23 SENTENCE) 524 U.S. AT 725, 118 S. CT. 2246 ("ACCORDING TO  
24 CALIFORNIA LAW, A NUMBER OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS  
25 SURROUND THE ASSESSMENT OF PRIOR CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS",  
26 DEFENDANTS MAY INVOKE THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL... THE PROSECUTION  
27 MUST PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND  
28 THE RULES OF EVIDENCE APPLY") § CODE CIV. PROC. § 2031.010.



MEMORANDUM A POINTS OF AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF GROUNDS VIOLATION OF

U.S. CONST AMENDMENTS 5TH AND 14TH DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

CLAUSES PURSUANT TO U.S. V. AGURS (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct.

239 FOR PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND SUPPRESSION

ARGUMENT UNDER PROPOSITION 115, CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN

CALIFORNIA IS NOW GOVERNED BY STATUTE RATHER

THAN JUDICIAL POLICY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF

EVIDENCE THAT TENDS TO EXCULPATE A DEFENDANT

OR REDUCE PENALTY.

WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE CRIME VICTIMS JUSTICE REFORM  
ACT IS NOW GOVERNED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY  
ENACTMENT.

PROPOSITION 115 ALSO ADDED A CHAPTER TO THE PENAL CODE  
SETTING FORTH BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL RULES FOR  
DISCOVERY, ONE OF THE STATED PURPOSES OF THIS CHAPTER IS,  
"OR AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES".  
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS EMPHASIZED THAT EVEN AFTER  
AEDPA FEDERAL COURTS HAVE AN INDEPENDENT  
RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERPRET FEDERAL LAW - WILLIAMS V.  
TAYLOR (2000) 529 U.S. 362 [120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389]

IN U.S. V. AGURS (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct.  
2392, THE SUPREME COURT STATED THAT FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH  
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSES REQUIRE THAT THE SCOPE  
AND DUTY OF THE PROSECUTOR BE EXPANDED